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STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS

BL

On September 29, 1983, appellants The Clovis National
and The Citizens Bank of Clovis (the "Clovis Banks") filed
brief

their

Ar

(the

"Clovis Brief")

in this

appeal.

Respondent

]as Corporation ("At las") filed its brief (the "At las Brief")

~ 1 th

the Court on October 31, 1983.

this Reply

The Clovis Banks now submit

Brief which responds to new arguments and theories

raised by At las in its brief.
INTRODUCTION
In its brief, Atlas demonstrates its continuing inabi!ity to get its story straight.

consistent
district

construction of the Agreements that can support the
court's

ruling.

On

construction issues, Atlas'
dictions.

Atlas still has not formulated a

the

most

argument

crucial

collapses

factual

and

in self-contra-

For example, at one point in its brief, Atlas unambi-

guously disavows the "one ore body" theory upon which it relied
in the court below, 1 and upon which the district court at least
in part based its decision, see,

29,

39,

~·,

r~l1ll,

19-21,

't~ues

that the Agreements covered a single "mining venture" and

R.

2084-86,

Findings and Conclusions

I

2089-2092,

2098.

Atlas now

Motion of Atlas for Summary Judgment at 33, R.
For the Court's convenience, the Clovis Banks will
-ont1nue the citation form used in the Clovis Brief. Citations
to documents in the record will include the title of the
00 cument, the page number or section of the document, and a
CJtation to the record.
·oce,

l\Q/

~._g.,

1

-1-

the "aining venture" involved a single ore body, but that was

,,

aerely the way things turned out;

nothing in

the

Agreements

ulited the "venture" to one body.

Atlas Brief at 49.

of- the "one ore body" theory, Atlas substitutes a
operation" construction.

Using this

In place

"sequential

logic, Atlas asserts that

the Agreements contemplated a conditional sequence of operations
which, once performed, caused the Agreements to expire.
this

construction,

Agreements

in turn,

expressly

development,

[and]

collides

providing

mining"

for

after

with

language

"exploration,

the

initial

Yet when
in

the

drilling,

sequence

of

operations, see Operating Agreement § Ill, 1548-49, Atlas simply
reverts to its

earlier

story.

The

damaging

language,

Atlas

argues, must be understood to refer only to additional operations
on the first ore body.

Atlas Brief at 37-38.

Atlas similarly vacillates in its description of the
most essential facts.

Attempting to support the district court's

ruling, Atlas indicates at one point that the Claims had been
fully explored before the Bardon Shaft was abandoned in late 1960
or early 1961, so that the closure of the Bardon Shaft completed
performance, and the Agreements and the Net Profits Interest were
extinquished at that time.

Atlas Brief at 23 n.

7.

However,

when confronted with incontrovertible evidence that Kerr-McGee
planned further operations and considered the Agreements to be
effect in 1962,

see

~.,

in

Letter from Kerr-McGee to Wm. Dean

HcDougald (Hay 9, 1962), R. 1882; Affidavit of Richard T. Zitting

-2-

1773,

Atlas

abandons

this position and argues that

,1-Hc:Gee must have completed performance, and resolved that no
4

1.lnt.er work would be done, "some time near December 30, 1962."
Atlas Brief at 50 n. 142 (emphasis added).
These

contradictions

are

not

inadvertencies,

they

reflect the fact that Atlas is spinning a tale which has only
occasional and tenuous connections to the actual language of the
Agreements

and to the evidence of what actually happened.

A

review of Atlas' arguments demonstrates that Atlas cannot invent,
much less support, a construction of the Agreements or a version
of the historical events that would sustain the district court's
rulings,

As

~erlooked,

a

result,

even

if

its

contradictions

could be

Atlas' argument is manifestly inadequate to support a

summary judgment.

The arguments offered by Atlas attempt to divert the
Court's attention from a common sense evaluation of the transaction as a whole

to an approach that

requires

an intricate

dissection of a few of the words and phrases used in the Agreemerits.

The

emphasis on

intricate
these

construction urged by Atlas places more

isolated

;a.ties could have possibly
' ''' 1

,J

<o<l.

bits

of

the

contemplated.

Agreements

than

the

As will be demon-

this Court should not focus upon the subtle intricacies

shadings urged by Atlas or follow the numerous "red herrings"

:·ff~red by Atlas to support

its irrelevant conclusions.

Rather,

the Court should step back from the 1957 transaction and view it

-3-

as a whole, giving a fair and literal meaning to the language ut

..'

t1w

Agreements.

a~ording

2

The

Court

should

enforce

the

Agreements

to their plain meaning and give effect to the deal as

struck by the parties in 1957 rather than as viewed by the
district court, which based its construction upon an unanticipated hiatus in operations that occurred in the 1960' s.
The Court should reverse the decision of the district
court and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in
favor of the Clovis Banks.

2 rn so doing, the Court should seek to answer a few basic
questions. First, did the Interest Owners clearly intend to give
up all of their interest in over 700 acres of mining claims in
exchange for a one-shot exploration effort on one edge of the
Claims by Kerr-McGee? The potential of the Claims was obviously
known to them, see Deposition of R. D. Boone at 36-37, 42, R.
1142-43, 1148, but only a fraction of the Claims had been
explored, see, Deposition of William McDougald at 75(4) - 77(10),
116(21) - 117(19), R. 447-48, 488-89. Second, could the parties
have clearly intended that the express language of duration set
forth in the Operating Agreement be superceded by implied
language that limited their deal to a "single mining venture"?
Third, after acknowledging that the Operating Agreement pertained
to all of the Claims, could Kerr-McGee's actions in abandoning a
very specifically described 7.5 acre tract be implied to
terminate the entire Agreement? Finally, by defining a series of
activities related to evaluation and development of the initial
exploration target, did the parties mean to rule out all later
exploration and development activities?
If all of these
questions or the numerous other questions raised in this brief
cannot be answered with an unequivocal "yes", this Court must
reverse the judgment of the district court and rule in favor of
the Clovis Banks.

-4-

ARGUMENT
ATLAS HAS_JAILED TO PRESENT ANY PLAUSIBLE RATIONALE TO
SUPPLll(T_l_HE_DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENTS
AJ'[l THE NET PROFITS INTEREST HAVE EXPIRED OR TERMINATED.
At las· Content ion that the Agreements Contemplated a
':_Conditional and Sequential" Operation cannot Support
the Conclusion that the Agreements, or the Net Profits
Interest, Have Expired.

A

Atlas'

principal

argument

is

that

the

Agreements

contemplated a sequence of operations in which only the
stage,~-,

exploration, was mandatory.

first

Under this theory, only

if exploration resulted in the discovery of ore would a mir.e be

developed, and only if the mine generated profits would there be
, d1str1but1on

of

proceeds.

This

argument

proves

precisely

notlnng, since it is undisputed that exploration has occurred, a
ml!le has been developed, and profits have been generated.

Indeed,
:.ature of the

Atlas

operator's

wholly

misconceives

obligations.

That

the

"conditional"

a mine

cannot be

developed unless ore is found, and that profits cannot be distrib'J\ ed

unless

they

are generated,

are not

'conditions" imposed by the Agreements.
"tnous facts of nature.
i1°terest do not

consequences

of any

Rather, they are simply

The provisions creating the Net Profits

refer to any conditions, but make the interest

·r·1 i1c<1ble to "all ores mined, produced, saved and sold from said
'W•

1'49
0

Agreement at 5, R.
Of course,

1540; Operating Agreement at 4, R.

if no ores were "mined, produced, saved and

old" no revenue would be generated for the Net Profits Interest

owners.

This

result

would not

be because the
-5-

interest would

..

"terainate" or "expire," but would merely be because there would

On the other hand, when ore

be,no profits to d1str1bute.

fJind

is

and profits are generated (as has in fact happened), the

provisions

applicable

to

such

profits

must

determine

their

distribution.
Attempting to confer cogency on its argument,

Atlas

asserts that the Agreements contemplated a sequential operation
that would be performed only once, and that subsequent operations
would thus not
36-38.

be covered by the Agreements.

Atlas Brief at

This construction must be rejected for at

reasons.

First,

At las has

least

three

conjured up the "single sequence"

construction out of the air;

the Agreements nowhere state that

they are limited to a single sequence of operations.

Instead,

the Agreements expressly provide that they will continue in force
so long as any of the Claims are in effect.
Agreement at 2,

R.

1547.

Second,

See~··

Operating

the "sequential operation"

language upon which Atlas purports to rely appears in a section
.. " Id. at 3, R.

dealing with "Commencement of Activities

1548 (emphasis supplied).
indicates

that

any

Thus, the very title of the section

sequence

of

operations

described

therein

cannot be understood to limit the entire scope of activity, but
aerely refers to the initial exploration target.

Moreover,

the

aame section upon which Atlas relies as the foundation for its
theory expressly provides for additional "exploration, drillinfu
development,

[and]

mining" after the

-6-

initial

operations.

Id.

' " language affirmatively proves that the Agreements did not
.,~template

A~as

only a

provides

one-shot

no

basis

sequence of operations.
for

interpreting

these

Finally,
express

;b1igations as anything more than additional express obligations
undertaken by the operator that were not conditions precedent to
~nything.

B.

Atlas' Contention that the Agreements were "Fully
Performed" Is Wholly Without Support in the
Evidence or in the Agreements.

Atlas

contends

that after initial exploration of the

Claims, Kerr-McGee decided that further exploration was unwarranted.

Atlas Brief at 24-25.

,1ec1s1on meant

that

Atlas argues that this supposed

performance

causing the Agreements

was

to terminate.

"complete,"
Id.

thus

somehow

The assertion that

¥err-McGee decided further exploration was unwarranted is rank
fiction.

See infra at pp. 44-48.

Yet even if Kerr-McGee had

reached such a decision, the contention that this decision would
have terminated the Agreements or extinguished the other parties'
rights is flatly at odds with the language of the Agreements.
~uwhere

in the Agreements is there any provision defining "full

performance" or indicating that upon any level of performance the
'' e~ments would

terminate

or expire.

Instead,

the Agreements

P10v1de that they will not terminate so long as any of the Claims
remain in force.

See Operating Agreement § I, R. 1547.

Atlas'

argument seeks to rewrite not only the Agreements in this case,

-7-

but

the

law of

contracts

-Vtiple obligations.

as

well.

Agreements

A party's performance

often create

of one obligation

a.ling multiple obligations hardly operates to discharge the other
obiigations or to terminate the agreement.
Atlas, that has happened in this case.

Yet

according to

3

The Agreements imposed a number of obligations on the
operator.

Section 5 of the Agreement and the first

part

of

Section III of the Operating Agreement require the operator to
explore and develop the Claims.

Section 6 of the Agreement and

the second part of Section III of the Operating Agreement require
the operator to pay the Interest Owners a specified percentage of
"all ores mined,

produced and sold from said claims."

Atlas

argues that the alleged performance of the first duty by KerrMcGee, the original operator, discharged the latter duty as well,

3

Atlas' proposed construction is flatly at odds with this
Court's policy of construing contracts and evidence in a manner
that does not work a forfeiture of rights.
As this Court
declared in Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah
1972):
[I]nasmuch as the plaintiff had its attorneys
draw the contract, its provisions should be
construed most strictly against plaintiff, and
this is especially true as to a forfeiture,
which is enforced only when the terms are
clear and unequivocal.
See also U-Beva Hines v. Toledo Mining Co., 471 P.2d 867, 869
(Utah 1970) (recognizing a "generally accepted policy against
forfeiture.
."); cf. Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Revie~.
568 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1977) ("a statute for a forfeiture should
be strictly construed").

-8-

the operator was no longer required to distribute profits

1 ~8 1

:rt•UJ ores mined, produced and sold from the Claims.
aJ 24·33.
in

Atlas Brief

There is simply no support, either in contract law or

the language of the Agreements, for this strikingly illogical

.

conclusion.

4

Atlas seeks refuge in a number of hypotheticals that
are counterfactual and thus beside the point.
had been found, then .
. .)
thetical,

(~.,

If no ore

If no profits had been earned, then

Atlas Brief at 19-22, 36.

However,

which upon inspection turns

out

factual, highlights the absurdity of Atlas'

a different hypo-

not

to be

counter-

reasoning.

Suppose

Kerr· McGee had explored and, finding nothing at first, had

4

At las' content ion that Kerr-McGee fully performed its duty to
explore merely attempts to divert the Court's attention to a
false issue which need not even be addressed. Atlas argues at
length that the Operator's duty cannot be understood to require
endless exploration, Atlas Brief at 32, and that any claim the
Interest Owners may have had for breach of this duty has been
lost by inaction and passage of time, id. at 52-53.
Such
arguments amount to a mere red herring. The Clovis Banks have
not alleged any such breach.
To be sure, the extent of an
operator's duty to explore may, in some cases, raise difficult
questions.
Those questions are hardly pertinent here. In the
present case, it is undisputed that Kerr-McGee and/or at least
ur1e of its successors did conduct further exploration of the
Lla1m5 after closure of the Bardon Shaft, and that such explora' '""has resulted in the discovery and mining of vast amounts of
v!>c
See Clovis Brief at 10; Atlas Brief at 13. Moreover, it is
111
1d1sputed that the Agreements contain unambiguous provisions
defining the parties' rights to share in the profits from that
"re
~ee Agreement '116, R. 1540-41; Operating Agreement §§ Ill,
!\', R. 1549-50. How other provisions in the Agreements might be
'nterpreted if the facts had been different is a question far
beyond the bounds of proper consideration.
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bl

de~ided
L

b

and announced that further exploration was not justified,

then changed its mind,
anza.

resumed exploration,

and struck a

Kerr-McGee obviously could not have claimed that its

earlier decision to end exploration had extinquished the Interest
Owners'

rights to their specified share of the profits.

Yet

(although there is in reality no evidence that Kerr-McGee or the
subsequent operator ever decided to discontinue exploration),
that is in substance exactly the claim that Atlas now makes.

To

be sure, the bonanza was discovered not by Kerr-McGee itself but
by a successor.

That fact makes no difference, however, because,

the Agreements are unambiguously applicable to "successors and
assigns."
Atlas'

present

construction necessarily acknowledges

that if Kerr-McGee had found and mined additional ore, then the
production of such ore would have been subject to the Net Profits
lnterest.

5

Thus,

the

unavoidable

conclusion

Agreements, and the Net Profits Interest,

is

do~

that

the

to the profits

earned by Atlas as Kerr-McGee's successor. 6

5
Atlas Brief at 49: "The AGREEMENTS, and the mining venture,
applied to whatever KERR-MCGEE found in its testing, defining and
developing of the SUBJECT CLAIMS."
6

Any other interpretation would be unreasonable, since it would
allow any operator to acquire mining property and then immediately nullify all of the grantor's reserved rights simply by
conveying the property to a successor. General principles of
contract construction require that such unreasonable interpretations be disregarded. See, .!...:..S·, Weiner v. Wilshire Oil
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c.

Atlas Has Offered No Colorable Explanation for the
Numerous Provisions Making the
Net
Profits
Interest Applicable to All Ores Mined from ''Said
Claims" So Long as the Claims Remain in Force.

Atlas'

assertions that the Agreements

contemplated a

sequential operation and that Kerr-McGee fulfilled its duty to
explore the Claims exhaust Atlas'

affirmative arguments for its

tavored construction.

The balance of Atlas'

ments consists

effort

of

an

to

explain

construction argu-

away

the

provisions

stating that the Agreements continue in effect so long as the
:!aims are in force and that the Net Profits Interest applies to
"all ores" mined

from

"said

claims."

explanations merely serve to underscore

However,
the

the proferred

frailty

of Atlas'

position.

1.

Section I - the "Period of Agreement" provision.

Section

I

of

the

Operating

Agreement

"Period of Agreement Concerning Operations,"

defines

the

and unambiguously

provides that the Agreements will continue so long as any of the
r!a1ms remain in
Acknowledging that

force.
the

Operating Agreement

at

2,

R.

1547.

Claim!> are still in force and that no

ternnnation has occurred under Section I, Atlas suggests that the
oection is only one of "many limitations" on duration contained
n tl,e
0

Agreements, and that the Agreements were terminated under

ther limitation provisions.

Atlas Brief at 17-18.

~, 192 Kan. 490, 389 P.2d 803 (1964).
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In making

this

argument,

Atlas

studiously

avoids

<'

actually quoting Section I, because the language in fact preIndeed, Section I is not a "limita-

cildes Atlas' construction.

tii>n" provision at all, but rather a non-limitation provision:
It is agreed by and between the parties
hereto that this Agreement shall be in full
force and effect so long as any of the mining
claims hereinabove identified and described
are in force and effect.
Operating Agreement § I. R. 1547.
Thus,

Section I

does

not

establish

limiting or terminating the Agreement.
disclaim any such conditions.

conditions

for

Its whole effect is to

The plain language of Section I,

therefore, precludes precisely the kind of "implicit termination"
construction that Atlas urges.
Section I

Moreover, Atlas' suggestion that

was included in the Agreements merely to cover the

possible situation in which "the United States or some rival
locator

(might]

obtain a

ruling that

the SUBJECT CLAIMS were

invalid," Atlas Brief at 17, would simply render the section
superfluous.
nullify

the

A determination
parties'

rights

of

invalidity

and duties

Agreement as a matter of law.

Moreover,

would

under

the

obviously
Operating

even if the actual

language of Section I could be disregarded, as Atlas evidently
prefers, it is hardly likely that the parties would have included
under the title of "Period of Agreement"

in the very

first

section of the Operating Agreement, such an utterly pointless
provision.
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2.

claims."

Itfl
1rrg

The provisions tying the duration of the Net
Profits Interest and the Agreements to "said

As noted in the Clovis Brief, the Agreement and OperatAgreement

repeatedly make

rights and obligations

their duration and the parties'

co-extensive with the duration of the

Clovis Brief at 18-22.

Claims.

The Net Profits Interest,

for

example, is expressly made applicable to "all ores mined, produced, saved and sold from said claims."

Operating Agreement at

4, R. 1549 (emphasis added).
In response, Atlas boldly asserts that the phrase "said
claims" are used "in conjunction with - even interchangeably with
· the terms

mine';

ore body', and 'shaft.'"

Atlas Brief at 39.

However, Atlas does not cite a single instance of such supposed
interchangeable usage.

Thus, while the meaning of the phrase is

obviously crucial in the construction of the Agreements, Atlas
offers not even the barest pretense of textual support for its
proposed construction.
In fact,
point.

the Agreements

are perfectly clear on this

The first page of the Agreement gives a precise

description

of

the

Velvet

and

Royal

Flush

claims

legal

and

then

1ounediately abbreviates that description with the phrase "said
1

d1rns

"

Agreement

at

1,

R.

1536.

Operating Agreement does the same.

1546

The

first

page

of

the

Operating Agreement at 1, R.

In case there could be any confusion, Section I

of the

Operating Agreement then makes the Agreement effective "so long

-13-

a• any of the mining claims hereinabove identified and described
li..

•

are in force and effect."

Id.

1547 (emphasis added1

at 2, R.

B'h Agreements repeatedly use the phrase "said claims" without
ever hinting that any limitation to a "mine," "shaft," or "ore
body" might be intended.

Indeed, before any of these terms even

appear in the Operating Agreement, the phrase "said claims" has
already been employed several times in direct reference to the
legal description of all of the Velvet Claims.
R. 1546-47.

See id.

at 1-2,

Thus, Atlas' suggestion of an implicit synonymity is

flatly at variance with the language of the Agreements.
3.

The provisions subjecting "all ores" to the
Net Profits Interest.

The Agreements expressly contradict

the construction

proposed by Atlas that the Net Profits Interest applied only to
ores from an initial mining venture and thus is not applicable to
ores produced from the Velvet Mine.

The Net Profits Interest

expressly applies to "all ores mined, produced, saved and sold
from said claims."
added).

Operating Agreement at 4, R.

1549 (emphasis

Atlas now seeks to avoid this provision by suggesting an

ingenious construction; the phrase "all ores" does not mean "all
ores," but rather "all kinds of ores,"
thorium, manganese, etc.

8

..

uranium, vanadium,

Atlas Brief at 38-39.

This construction simply does not work.

The construe-

tion merely reads into the Agreements a limitation that cannot be
found anywhere in, and indeed is contradicted by, the language of
the

Agreements.

To

be

sure,

the

-14-

Net

Profits

Interest

is

.,.1«able
8'1fgests

to all

kinds

of

ores,

as

the

and as the Agreement specifies.

1~6-37.

phrase

"all

ores"

Agreement at 23-24, R.

But it hardly follows that because "all ores" can be

understood to include "al 1 kinds of ores" it can then be read to
mean "some of all kinds of ores."

metamorphased

into

"not

all

The term "all ores" cannot be

ores," simply by the use

of an

intermediate step.

4.

The provisions expressly contemplating subsequent "exploration, drilling, development,
[and] mining."

Section I I I of the Operating Agreement expressly provides

for

"exploration,

drilling,

development,

after the development of the "initial" mine,
Atlas' position that

i~

thereby destroying

Operating Agree-

See also Agreement at 5, R. 1540.

to explain away these provisions, Atlas

language refers

mining"

the Agreements contemplated a sequence of

opeiations that would be performed only once.
ment at 3, R. 1548.

[and]

only to

suggests

additional exploration,

Attemptthat

the

drilling,

and

mining that might be performed on the initial ore body.

At las

Brief at 37-38.
Typically, Atlas is not troubled by the fact that the
language of

the Agreements

suggests

no

such

limitation,

and

JildPed explicitly refers to later exploration and mining of "said
1

ia1ms," not

1548.

of "said ore body." Operating Agreement at 3, R.

Even if these textual problems could be overlooked,

the

argument merely evidences Atlas' inability to make up its mind as
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to why

the Agreements

terminated.

Earlier,

as

has

been ex

i.'-

P\f'ined, Atlas purported to find in the Agreements a "one ore
bJLy" limitation.
pu-i:ports

to

See supra p.

1.

eschew that position,

For good reason, Atlas no"'
7

and

in its

present

brief

tries to develop a construction based on the assumption that the
Agreements contemplated a sequence of operations that would be
performed only once.

Atlas Brief at 34-37. That construction,

however, is in turn prevented by the express provisions governing
continued operations after the first sequence of operations.

In

addition, the "single sequence" argument is not strengthened by
Atlas'

attempt

to

smuggle

back

into

the

case

the

already

discarded "one ore body" theory.
Atlas

has

seemingly adopted a

Faced with insurmountable difficulties

"flip-flop" strategy.
in the "one ore body"

theory, Atlas recants and proposes a "single sequence" construetion instead; but when that construction collides head-on with
the text of the Agreements, Atlas tries to gloss over the problem
by hauling out (though only for a moment) the "one ore body"

7
L.L_, Atlas Brief at 49: "THE AGREEMENTS, and the mining venture, applied to whatever Kerr-McGee found in its testing,
defining and developing of the SUBJECT CLAIMS. As it turns out,
only one ore body (the BARDON MINE) was discovered, defined and
developed.
As it turned out, only one shaft was used.
The
AGREEMENTS did not terminate because, from the outset, they were
limited to a single ore body."
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The
in~uperable

~

flip-flop

maneuver

merely

highlights

the

flaws in Atlas' position.

D.

Considered as a Whole, the Agreements Preclude the
Construction Favored by Atlas.

Insisting that the Operating Agreement must be read as
a whole, Atlas suggests that the Clovis Banks'
based entirely on the first
Agreement.

Atlas Brief at

construction is

and last sections of the Operating
34-35.

These provisions

have been

discussed at length in the Clovis Brief and need not be repeated
at length here.
unambiguously

Very briefly,

makes

the

it may be noted that Section I

duration

of

the

Operating Agreement

coterminous with the existence of the Claims, Operating Agreement
§I, R.

that

the

1547;

that the Operating Agreement's recitals provide

Interest

Owners

"have

reserved

undivided net profits interest

unto

themselves

an

in and to the net profits

from all ores, mined, saved, removed, and sold from said claims,"
Id. at 1, R. 1546 (emphasis added); that Section III contains a
similar provision, as well as language
continuing exploration, development,

expressly contemplating

and mining,

Id.

§ III,

1548-49; that Section V explicitly provides for "mines"

plural),

Id.

§ V, R.

arp ullambiguous

1550-51;

in providing

R.

(in the

and that Sections VIII and XVIII
that

•nulJ bind successors and assigns.

all

terms

of

the Agreement

Id. §VII, at 9, R. 1554; Id.

\XVIII, R. 1560.

Thus,
numerous

the Clovis Banks'

provisions

throughout

construction is

the

-17-

Operating

supported by

Agreement.

By

contrast, it is Atlas whose construction of the Agreements is

-'

bated solely on an interpretation of language in Section III of
t J Operating Agreement.
II~

THE NET PROFITS INTEREST IS AN ESTATE IN LAND BINDING UPON
ATLAS.
Atlas next asserts that the parties to the 1957 Agree-

ments did not intend to create a perpetual net profits interest
with characteristics of other estates in land.
Atlas agrues,
accepted

the interest does not bind it

principles

of

contract

law.

As a

result,

under generally

However,

rather

than

provide substantive rebuttal to the Clovis Banks' position that
the Net Profits Interest is an interest in land, Atlas merely
repeats its prior argument that
that

the Net

Profits

Interest

the Agreements terminated and
was

somehow abandoned

in the

process.
A.

The Net Profits Interest Is An Interest in Land
Binding Upon Subsequent Owners of the Claims.

Atlas'

argument

is

based upon its

conclusion that

"[n)one of the authorities cited by the Clovis Banks stand for
the proposition that

all

net

profits

interests

are mineral

interests or estates in land or any other perpetual interest.··
Atlas Brief at 42-43 (emphasis added).

The Clovis Banks have not

asserted, and do not here assert, that all net profits interests

are interests in land.

The Clovis Banks do assert, however, that

an analysis of the Net Profits Interest created by the April 18,
1957 Agreement demonstrates that it is an estate in land, rather

-18-

'""" a mere "share in a coDDDon fund of profits" unrelated to the
,[pms, as contended by Atlas.

f

Atlas agrees that "net profits interests may share some

if the characteristics of
~yalty,

at 42.
Interest

an

overriding

royalty

interest,

a

a working interest, or a carried interest." Atlas Brief
Atlas then inconsistently asserts that the Net Profits
defined

interests."
Net

Atlas Brief at 42.

Profits

Id.

in

the

Agreements

(emphasis added).

Interest

is

unlike

a

is

"unlike

any

of those

First, Atlas asserts that the
royalty

interest

because a

royalty "is not a cost bearing interest at all, and is calculated
>ithout respect to costs or profits." Id. at 42 n. 115.
ibly, Atlas apparently overlooks the fact

interest

and a

that

Incred-

both a working

carried working interest -- each of which are

indisputably estates in land

are cost-bearing interests cal-

culated on costs or profits.
Second, Atlas emphasizes that the Net Profits Interest
is a "share
01.ners']

in a

share

is

common

fund

dependent

specific level of profits."
cnurse, that any interest,

of

profits

and

[the

Interest

upon the operations attaining a
Id.

It

is

patently

obvious,

of

such as a working interest, that is

·:dcu1ated on a "net" basis 8 comes from a coDDDon fund of

8
Even gross

proceeds royalties frequently share some costs,
such as transportation or smelting charges.
Gushee, Drafting
~ctical Royalty Clauses for the Mining Lease, 2 Rocky Mtn. Min.
L. Fdn. 625, 634-640 (1975). As a result, these interests are
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profit•,

,,

because

if one

interest owner receives a specified

percentage of proceeds, the other interest owners can only share
iJf what is left of the common fund.

Indeed, this point rein-

forces the characterization of the Net Profits
interest in land.

The Net Profits Interest

share of common production from
interest

in

Atlas'

revenues

the

is measured as a

Claims,

generally.

Interest as an

rather

Atlas

than an

provides

no

authority for the proposition that sharing in a common fund of
proceeds from production somehow destroys the nature of the Net
Profits Interest as an interest in land.

Atlas' argument seems

to be that by merely calling the Net Profits Interest a "profit
sharing arrangement" it will be held to be a
right.

mere

contract

9
Third,

Atlas

points

out

that

that working interest

owners have executive rights and the obligation to pay expenses
but

the

Interest Owners do not.

At las Brief at 42 n.

115.

Because of this, Atlas concludes, the Net Profits Interest cannot
be a working interest.

Once again, Atlas overlooks the fact that

these characteristics are exactly those reflected in the royalty

likewise dependent upon operations achieving a specific level of
profitability in order to produce financial returns.
9
Interestingly, the parties to the Agreements never referred to
the Net Profits Interest as a "profit sharing arrangement," but
called it a "net profits interest" that was "reserved unto
themselves." Operating Agreement at 1, R.. 1546.
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and the carried working interest,

,,, , .est

both of which are

, 19 sely related to net profits interests and are uniformly recognMed as interests in land.

10

Atlas also ignores the fact that

tire parties executed an Operating Agreement,

the parties

rights.

believed that

Interest

Owners

had

executive

11
Finally,

Atlas

Atlas Brief at 41 n.
profits

the

an indication that

attempts

to rely on two authorities,

114, to support the proposition that net

interests are not

recognized as

To be sure, as At las quotes,

interests

in land.

12

one authority contends that "any

consideration of the nature of the net profits interest arrangement, which cont a ins no further speci fi city beyond the words 'net

10
see
2 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms
84(1982) (noting "the close kinship between carried interests
and net profits interests").
Just as carried interests, net
profits interests are "carved out of the working interest." Id.
at 457. The close relationship between the Net Profits Interest
and working
interests
is
further
bolstered
by
the
characterizations used by the Interest Owners. See Clovis Brief
at 41-43.
11
Only owners of executve rights must execute an operating
agreement, which is defined as "an agreement among concurrent
owners of interests in land." 2 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra
note 10, at 505.
!?
"In the Clovis Brief, the Clovis Banks presented substantial
•upport for the proposition that the phrase "net profits
interest" is recognized as a term of art that describes an
interest in land.
Because Atlas has not attempted to refute
those authorities, the Clovis Banks will not repeat their argument here.
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profits interest'
Atfas fails,

per se,

is a

"13

leap into fantasy

however, to reveal to the Court that this autho-

rtly•a discomfort with the use of these words is not focused upon
the concept that the interest is not an estate in land, but is
due to the fact that many times, the needed "further specifity"
is missing from

the

defining

document.

However,

where

that

specificity is present -- as in the instant case -- Atlas' own
authority agrees that "[n]et profits interests continue from and
after their creation for the term of the property interest from
which they are created so that a net profits interest is created
from the working interest and is a continuing burden upon it."
Sherrill, supra note 13, at 168.

The other authority relied upon

by Atlas is similarly quoted out of context and in fact supports
the Clovis Banks' contentions.

14

13
sherrill, Net Profits Interests - A Current View, 19 Inst. on
Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 165, 166 (l968)(emphasis added). Sherrill
notes that "[t]he frequent use through the years of net profits
interest arrangements has tended to lead many practioners to
consider the words 'net profits interest' to be words of art
describing a unique interest -- almost in the same sense as do
the words 'overriding royalty."' Id. at 165.
14
Atlas relies on 5 E. Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and
Gas §63.5 (1978). Professor Kuntz recognizes, as the Clovis
Banks stated in the Clovis Brief, that net profits interests have
not received broad treatment in the courts. Clovis Brief at 33.
~untz also recognizes, as Atlas points out, Atlas Brief at 41 n.
114, that a net profits interest may be an interest in land and
determination of the issue depends upon the provisions of the
instrument creating it. 5 E. Kuntz, supra §63.5. The Clovis
Banks have urged this Court to make such a determination by
analyzing the characteristics of the Net Profits Interest and its
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B.

~
Profits

The Net Profits Interest was Properly Created in
the Agreement and the Deed.

Atlas

next

objects

to

Interest was created.

the manner in which

Atlas Brief at 44 n.

the

118.

Net
Atlas

asserts that the April 18, 1957 Agreement "did not define a net
profits

interest."

Id.

paragraph to define it,

In fact,
~

the Agreement uses an entire

Agreement

~6,

R.

1540-41, and the

Operating Agreement and attached Accounting Procedure, which are
incorporated into the Agreement, devote even greater length to
the definition,

Operating Agreement

§ § III,

IV,

R.

1548-49.

Indeed, in the Operating Agreement, the parties used terms of art
generally applicable to real property interests in describing the
interest created in the Agreement:

"[SJ aid Interest Owners have

reserved unto themselves an undivided net profits interest
" Operating Agreement at 1, R. 1546.
t~

Thus, the parties viewed

Agreement as creating and defining the Net Profits Interest

and the Operating Agreement as governing the working relationship
of that interest with the interests being conveyed to Kerr-McGee
and Mercury.

affinity to other interests in land.
Clovis Brief at
Because the Net Profits Interest is absolutely dependent
~an, and is measured by production from, the Claims and because
of the way the parties characterized it, even Professor Kuntz
should be satisfied that the Net Profits Interest is an interest
in land.
close
IJ

41.
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Finally, the Deed was made expressly "subject to the

te~s. covenants and conditions in that certain agreement dated
t1't 18th day of April, 1957 by and between the parties hereto."
Mining Deed at 2, R.

1533.

limited the estate that

The use of the words "subject to"

passed to Mercury and Kerr-McGee and

excluded from the conveyance the interest created in the Agreement.

Atlas objects to this reasoning on the basis that "the

words 'subject to' do not mean incorporate by reference."
Brief at 44 n.

118.

However,

it

is commonly recognized that

"subject to" may mean charged with, subordinate to,
upon,

limited by,

Atlas

or reserving. 15

Moreover,

conditioned

the language used

in the Deed is not a typical "subject to" limitation that appears
as

boilerplate

conveyance

in

most

expressly

conditions"

contained

deeds.

"subject
in

the

Rather,
to

the

the
terms,

Agreements,

Deed makes

the

covenants

and

which

undeniably

includes the obligation to pay a share of proceeds to the owners
of the Net Profits Interest.
A number of courts,

including the

Supreme Court

of

Utah, have gone so far as to recognize that the words "subject
to" can operate to reserve an interest from a conveyance, see

15

see 40 Words & Phrases 591-97 (1964 & Supp. 1983). I t is
interesting to note that Atlas describes the conveyance to
Kerr-McGee and Mercury as being "subject to" the Bowen royalty
thus apparently recognizing that the words can be appropriately
used to show that an interest passed in a deed is limited or
burdened by a previously created interest. Atlas Brief at 7.
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Aspen Acres Association vs. Seven Associates, Inc., 29 Utah
!•J.303, 508 P.2d 1179 (1973);

Johnson v. Peck, 90 Utah 544, 63

pjd 251 (1937), and that the intent of the parties, rather than
the technical use of the words controls the effect of such terms.

See Hartman v.

Potter,

596 P.2d 653

Hendrickson v.

Freericks,

(Utah 1979).

in

620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1981) the Alaska

Supreme Court recognized that "a number of
(the words

Indeed,

cases interpreting

'subject to'] as creating a reservation of rights in

the granter involve the reservation of an easement
rights to minerals."

Id.

at 209.

or subsoil

If use of the words "subject

to" can work to create a reservation of a new interest in an
instrument, then no question should exist that the words "subject
to" as used in the Deed executed on June 7,

1957 could exclude

from

in

the

conveyance

the

interest

executed on April 18, 1957.

created

the

Agreement

Courts have uniformly viewed such

language to mean, at the very least, that the grant is limited by
some pre-existing right, such as the right to share proceeds as
defined

in

the

Agreements.

See,

~.

, Hyman v.

District

Columbia, 247 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Cockrell v.

of

Texas Gulf

Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672, 678 (1957).
The Supreme Court of Texas and the New Mexico Supreme
1.ourt have likewise very recently ruled that a deed made "subject
tu" some other interest or instrument,

binds the grantee under

the deed and its successors with that interest or instrument.
~estland Oil Development Corp.

In

v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903
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(Tex. 1982), a conveyance was made in a manner remarkably similar
<'

to,f hat used in the present case:

f.
·

this Assignment shall be subject to all the
provisions of that certain Operating Agreement dated March l, 1968 by and between
Assignor and Assignee. The provisions hereof
shall be binding upon, and inure to the
benefit of the parties hereto and their
respective heirs, devisees, legal representatives, successors and assigns.

Id. at 906.

In holding that the assignees and their successors

were bound by the equitable interests described in the March l,

1968 Operating Agreement, the Court stated:
[W]e hold that the reference to the March l,

1968, operating agreement contained in the
Hay 22, 1973, assignment from Mobil to Gulf

and Superior, as a matter of law, charged
Gulf and Superior with the duty of inspecting
said agreement.
As a result, Gulf and
Superior were charged with notice of the
November 15, 1966, letter agreement and the
equitable claim of Westland, and cannot enjoy
the status of innocent purchasers.

Id.

The same logic should control in the case at hand and Atlas'

interest in the Claims should be held to be burdened by the Net
Profits Interest. 16

16

1n National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 381 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1964), a case similar to the instant case, the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals held that a grantee under a deed made
"subject to" a previously created but unrecorded net profits
interest was bound by the deed and obligated to honor the
interest:
The rule is that where a person takes a conveyance of land and in the deed into him,
which is accepted by him, it is recited that
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THE NET PROFITS INTEREST IS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST ATLAS AS A
~QVENANTRUNNINGWfTH THE LAND BOTH IN LAW AND IN EQUITY.

15

f

Atlas argues in its brief that the Net Profits Interest

not enforceable because Atlas and the Clovis Banks were not

the original parties to the Agreements.

Atlas Brief at 53-54.

Atlas relies on a 1954 decision of a Texas appellate court, LeBus
~.

269 S.\ol.2d 506

(Tex.

Civ. App.

1954), for the broad

proposition that the Net Profits Interest in this case is "at the
most a contract right" unenforceable against successors that have
not expressly assumed the obligations imposed by the Agreements.
Atlas· reliance on LeBus,

however,

is misplaced.

In LeBus, the

issue presented was whether a partnership existed under the facts
before the court, not whether net profits interests are generally
enforceable against successors in interest .

17

he takes it subject to some contract he thereby admits its existence and its validity as of
that time. He cannot attack its validity because he has acknowledged its valid existence
as of that time and as a part of the consideration has contracted to honor it.
Id at 662 (citations omitted). See also LexPro Corp. v. Snyder
E_riters .. Civ. No. 14848 (N.M. sept. 21, 1983), N.M. St. Bar Bull.
1045 (Oct. 6, 1983).
;_/_

ln Le Bus, two brothers had been engaged in several oil and
!.as ventures.
On one occasion, one brother did not have

fl1c1ent capital to participate in the purchase of a particular
lease. The brothers consequently entered into an oral agreement
that if the non-cash contributing brother rendered services in
negotiating lease terms for acquisition of the desired lease, the
other brother would pay to the service contributor 1/4 of the net
Profits of any resale or 1/4 of the net profits of production.
\ 0
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Under the law of real covenants, successors in interest

are bound by the terms of covenants that are related to land,
L'

w~hout

expressly assuming any obligations.

Indeed, enforce-

abllity of covenants without express assumption is the basis for
the law of real covenants.
their brief,

As the Clovis Banks demonstrated in

the covenant to pay net profits

against Atlas both in law and in equity.

is enforceable

Several points raised

in the Atlas Brief distort the law and the facts and, therefore,
merit further mention.
A.

The Net Profits Interest is Enforceable At Law.
The Clovis Brief addresses the elements required for

real covenants to run with land at law and demonstrates that
those elements are satisfied in this
51-59.

case.

Clovis Brief at

The Net Profits Interest touches and concerns both the

possessory

estate

in the

Claims

and

the

Interest

Owners'

retained interest; the element of privity is satisfied; and the
parties clearly intended the covenant to run with the

land.

Atlas agrees that if these elements are present, the covenant

The court determined that it was the intent of the parties only
to enter a contract for personal services as opposed to a partnership agreement. Therefore, when the service contributor died,
the personal service contract terminated and there was no
partnership interest for the heirs of the service contributor to
inherit. Because LeBus deals with strictly a partnership question, there is no way it can be even remotely construed as
authority for the proposition that net profits interests are held
to be contract rights.
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0

•

11

run at

law,

but

eg\1sfied in this case.

asserts

that

none of the elements is

Atlas Brief at 55.

ti
1.

The covenant to pay net profits touches and
concerns the Interest Owners' retained
interest in the Claims.

The thrust

of Atlas'

argument

is

that,

because the

Clovis Banks have not succeeded to a sufficient estate in the
Claims, the covenants in the Operating Agreement do not satisfy
the requirement that the covenants "touch and concern" the land.
Atlas' argument fails, however, to address adequately the cases
and authorities cited by the Clovis Banks, which demonstrate that
the rights in the Claims retained by the Interest Owners

(to

which the Clovis Banks have succeeded) constitute a sufficient
estate to

satisfy these elements.

18

Instead, Atlas focuses on

two decisions of this Court, Atlas Brief at 57-58, which deal
with the issue of whether the covenant must be related to the
physical use of land, and an isolated 1943 decision of the West

18

Clovis Brief at 53-54. It is unnecessary for this Court to
engage in the type of detailed inquiry into the exact label that
should be placed on the retained interest, as Atlas seems to urge
is necessary. See Atlas Brief at 59 n. 169. Such rights have
rereived variouslabels in the unique context of the mineral
•Hate, as remainders, possibilities of reverter and others.
See, ~._g.,
Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1983).
Regardless of the label, courts uniformly enforce covenants to
pay royalties under the law of real covenants whether based on
gross or net proceeds. See cases cited in the Clovis Brief at
53-54.
-
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Virginia Supreme Court, id. at 59, which has been severely critiL

'

ci!ed by oil and gas law authorities.

r.

As pointed out in the Clovis Brief, Clovis Brief at 52,

this Court has stated in dicta in the specific context of land
development, that a covenant must have a permanent effect of a
physical nature on land itself to satisfy the touch and concern
element.

See First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27

Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) (dicta).

However, in the later

case of Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 497 P.2d 648 (Utah 1972), this
Court restated the test in its holding:
In order for a covenant to run with land it
must be of such character that its performance or nonperformance will so affect the
use, value, or enjoyment of the land itself
that it must be regarded as an integral part
of the property.
Id. at 650 (emphasis added).

Thus, the test does not look to

whether the covenant has an effect of a physical nature on the
land, but whether the performance or nonperformance affects the
use, value or enjoyment of land. 19 The covenant to pay the Net
Profits Interest

in this

case affects

the use,

value,

and

enjoyment of both the covenant ors' and covenantees' interests in

19
Indeed, the Lundberg court went on to list specific covenants
affecting the use, value or enjoyment of land, which obviously
have no effect of a physical nature: "Examples are the covenants
of seizen, the right to convey, freedom from encumbrances, and of
quiet peaceable possession." Id. Accord Hudspeth v. Eastern
Oregon Land Co., 430 P. 2d 353, 356(0r--:-1967).
-30-

,h;,

as

Claims, and therefore satisfies the touch and concern element
by this Court in Lunde berg.

~phrased

r

To bolster its position that

the touch and concern

element is not satisfied, Atlas relies heavily on the case of
Mcintosh v. Vail,

126 W.Va.

395, 28 S.E.2d 607

(1943).

20

That

case, however, adopts an extreme minority position and has been
criticized
field. 21

by

authorities

in

the

mining

and

oil

and

gas

The majority of courts and authorities do not follow

the West Virginia view.

As noted in the Clovis Brief, covenants

to pay royalties whether based on net or gross proceeds, are

20

rn Mcintosh, the court held that specific language used in an
instrument did not evidence an intent to make a covenant to pay
an oil and gas royalty a real covenant. The decision was 3 to 2
md the dissent adopts the orthodox view that covenants to pay
mineral royalties are real covenants.

21

Referring to the West Virginia line of decisions that
includes Mcintosh, Williams and Meyers state, "Fortunately this
contribution to the learning on oil and gas law has not received
wide circulation." 1 H. William & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
§304.9, at 494.1 n.8 (1981).
The early West Virginia cases
apparently adopt a rule of construction influenced by Coke's Rule
which states: "But if a man seized of lands in fee by his deed
granteth to another the profits of those lands, . . . the whole
land itself doth pass; for what is land but the profits thereof.
" Coke upon Littleton 4b (17th ed. 1817). To avoid the
rule that the fee follows a grant of the profits, older West
Virginia cases favor a construction of mineral grants and
reservations limiting the duration of royalty-type interests.
See 1 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra at §304.9. As suggested by
Williams and Meyers, this Court should avoid introducing this
archaic rule into Utah law.
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uniformly accepted as satisfying the "touch and concern" element

;.

anli run with land.

22

2.

The parties plainly expressed their intent
that the covenant was to run with the land.

Atlas next asserts that the parties did not have the
necessary intent for the covenant to pay net profits to run with
the land, despite the plain language in the Agreements that its
terms and provisions "be deemed to be covenants running with the
land," Operating Agreement at 9, R. 1554, and that the terms and
provisions are binding on "heirs, administrators, successors and
assigns."

Id.

at

15, R.

1560. Atlas attempts to negate this

plain language with two arguments.

First, Atlas asserts that the

language in Section VIII of the Operating Agreement deals only
with the rights of Kerr-McGee and Mercury.
that the language in Section XVIII

Second, Atlas argues

is "standard boilerplate"

somehow not intended to refer to successors and assigns and not
specific enough to express an intention that the Net Profits
Interest runs with the land. 23 These arguments are without

22

clovis Brief at 53-54. Because the interest retained in the
Claims by the Interest Owners (to which the Clovis Banks are
direct successors) is sufficient to satisfy the "touch and
concern" requirement, it necessarily follows that the element of
privity is also satisfied. See 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real
Property, ,673[2], at 60-64 (1981).
23

Atlas bases this argument, in part, on the district court's
conclusion that many of the terms, covenants and conditions in
the Operating Agreement are purely mechanical matters which could
not have been intended to run. Atlas Brief at 61. However, the
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"" 1 r

and ignore the well established rule of construction that

"~[Jn

express statement of the parties as to the 'running' of the

cik.enant should normally be decisive." 24
Section

VIII

of

the

Operating

Agreement

directly

addresses the possibility of a transfer of the Claims to successors of Kerr-McGee and Mercury and provides, without limitation,
that:
All sales made by either Kermac or Mercury or their
respective successors in interest, shall be subject to
the terms, covenants and conditions of this Agreement,
and such terms, covenants and conditions shall be
deemed to be covenants running with the land and the
mineral estate covered hereby and with such transfer or
assignment thereof.
Operating Agreement at 9, R.

1554 (emphasis added).

This lan-

guage expressly applies to the terms, covenants and conditions of
the Agreement, not just the terms, covenants and conditions of
Section VIII, as concluded by the district court.

This section

of the Agreement is the most logical place for the parties to
express their intent that the covenants within the Agreement were

terms and covenants of Operating Agreements (including so-called
mechanical matters) are commonly enforced against successors in
interest. See, !...:_&., Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil
~., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982).
14
5 R. Powell, supra note 22, 11673[2] at 60-52; Clovis Brief
at 53-54. The only exception to this rule is where one of the
other elements is missing. See 5 R. Powell, supra note 22, 'IT
673[2] at 60-53. As demonstrated above and in the Clovis Brief,
the elements of privity and touch and concern have been met in
this case.
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to run with the land.
l.

pa~ties

Indeed, there is no other way that the

could have more plainly expressed this intent.

Simi-

1J!1y, in Section XVIII of the Operating Agreement the parties
exi)ressly repeated their intent that

the Agreements were not

binding on only the initial parties to the Agreement:
The terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the
parties hereto, their respective heirs, administrators,
successors and assigns.
Id. at 15, R. 1560 (emphasis added).

Again the parties referred

to the terms of the Agreement in expressing their devolutive
intent.

25
Atlas relies solely on the case of City of Glendale v.

Arizona Savings & Loan Association, 2 Ariz. App. 379, 409 P.2d

25 Atlas asserts that this language means only that "one who
accepts an assignment of the AGREEMENTS can enforce them against
those parties to the AGREEMENTS who were not parties to the
assignment," and that this language does not address purchasers
of the Claims who do not accept an assignment. Atlas Brief at
61.
This argument is wholly without merit.
Section XVIII
expressly makes both the burdens and benefits of the Agreement
binding on "successors and assigns" of all the parties to the
Agreement.
The definition normally attributed to the term
"assigns" as used in the Agreements, includes "all those who take
either immediately or remotely from or under the assignor,
whether by conveyance, devise, des cent or act of law." Black's
Law Dictionary, "Assigns" (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Moreover, the
term "assigns" is the language normally used to express the
intent that covenants are to run with land. See 5 R. Powell,
aupra note 22, t673[2), at 60-51. There is no evidence here that
the parties intended the term "assigns" to have an unorthodox
aeaning. Atlas acquired its interest in the Claims by conveyance
and therefore is bound to the terms of the Agreement as an
"assign."
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199 (1965), for its argument that the language in the Agreement
is[ not specific enough to show the parties'
c'enant

to

pay

net

profits

runs

with the

intent that the
land.

Glendale,

however, is clearly distinguishable from this case on its facts.
The instrument
similar to

involved

in

Section XVIII

of

that
the

case

contained

a

provision

Operating Agreement.

That

general language, however, was negated by other specific language
in the instrument which was

in conflict with

intent expressed in the general provision.

the

devolutive

In this case, there

are no specific provisions in the Operating Agreement that even
remotely negate the general devolutive language in Section XVIII.
B.
Atlas

The Net Profits Interest is Enforceable in Equity.
argues

that

the

covenant

to pay net profits

should not be enforced in equity based upon an assumption that
equity requires a technical application of certain elements.

The

Utah Supreme Court has not previously adopted such a position,
Mr should it do so now.

As discussed at length in the Clovis

Brief, the key to the doctrine of enforceability of a covenant in
equity is notice.

Clovis Brief at 56-57.

This doctrine is based

upon the broad ground that where a purchaser acquires an estate
~th

notice of an outstanding interest, the failure to enforce

the covenant in equity would be unjust. Id.

1.

Atlas had notice of the Net Profits Interest.

In an effort to avoid the equitable notice doctrine,
Atlas now asserts that it did not acquire the Claims with actual
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knowledge or notice of the Net Profits Interest and, therefore,

a~uld

fJi

not be bound.

26

The district

court expressly assumed,

purposes of this summary judgment, that Atlas at least had

constructive
Authorities

notice

of

uniformly

the
agree

covenant
that

to

even

pay net

profits.

constructive

27

notice

satisfies the notice required for covenants to run with land in
equity.

See, !..:.A.:_, Schartz v. DRB&M Real Estate Partnership, 5

Kan. App. 2d 625, 621 P.2d 1024 (1981); 5

R. Powell, supra note

22, • 673[2), at 60-71 ("The rule of constructive notice charges
a successor with notice of any equitable covenant which is duly
recorded in a prior instrument for which the successor is required to search.").

A contrary

result would thwart the pro-

tection provided by the recording acts and would encourage those
acquiring property

interests

to

remain ignorant of interests

disclosed by the record.

26
Atlas Brief at 63-64. The apparent thrust of Atlas' argument
is that actual as opposed to constructive notice of the covenant
is necessary to its enforceability in equity.
27

see Findings and Conclusions at •45 n.3, R. 2107. Under Utah
law, all parties dealing with real property are conclusively
presumed to be on notice of the contents of recorded documents,
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-2 (1974), and the contents of any documents
that are referred to in the chain of title. See Haynes v. Gibbs,
110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946). Because the Agreements were
expressly referred to in the June 7, 1957 Deed, Atlas was charged
with notice of the contents of the Agreements at the time it
acquired the Claims.
Several additional documents of record
plainly disclose the existence of the Net Profits Interest. See
Memorandum of Clovis Banks at 10-13, R. 1301-04.
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2.

f

The Net Profits Interest is enforceable even
if the benefit is in gross.

Additionally,

impose a

strict

argues

that

this

"touch and concern" requirement

determining if the
land.

At las

covenant

Atlas Brief at 62.

Court

should

in equity in

to pay net profits runs with the

Atlas' position is that the covenant

should not run because the benefit does not touch and concern a
separate parcel of land owned by the promisee, but is in gross.
As demonstrated

above

and at

length in the Clovis Brief, the

benefit is not in gross, but touches and concerns the rights in
the Claims

52-53.

retained by

the

Interest Owners.

Clovis Brief at

But even if Atlas' technical application of the touch and

concern argument is correct, the covenant should nevertheless be
enforced under the better reasoned view that such covenant should
be enforced in equity if Atlas took with notice.
The eminent authority on the law of covenants, Judge
~arles

E. Clark,

concludes that no distinction should be made

between benefits touching and concerning separate land of the
promisee and personal benefits in determining whether the burden
of a covenant runs with the land.

18

28

c

One authority has

Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run With
app. I, 219-26, 239-41 (2d ed. 1947). Accord LexPro Corp.
v. Snyder Enters., Civ. No. 14848 (N.M. Sept. 21, 1983), N.M. St.
Bar Bull. 1045 (Oct. 6, 1983). Most other authorities are in
agreement with Judge Clark's view. See, ~. , 2 American Law of
Property § 9.32, at 430 (1952) ("there is no logical reason to
recognize the enforceability of legal easements in gross and deny
L~nd"
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•uggested that the burden of a covenant should be defeated where
<'
th~

benefit is in gross "only if in all the circumstances the
29
caltenant unreasonably restrains alienation. "
The Net Profits Interest and all other types of royalty
interests serve socially useful purposes and do not unreasonably
restrain alienation.

They allow development of mining properties

in situations in which the mineral owner alone does not have
sufficient capital to develop its property.

Failure to enforce

the Net Profits Interest would not only be unjust, see Clovis
Brief at 57-58, but would be a mechanical application of the law
of covenants that would result in the termination of a socially
desirable type of covenant.

Thus, this Court should enforce the

covenant to pay net profits in equity because Atlas took the
Claims with notice of the Net Profits Interest.

the existence of equitable servitudes in gross"); 5 R. Powell,
supra note 22, ~ 673[2], at 60-47.
29
Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 Mich. L.
Rev. 12, 43 (1978). Since public policy favors free alienability
of land, some cases hold that the burden of a covenant is allowed
to run only where the encumbrance is counter-balanced by a
benefit to some other interest in land. See Note, Covenants
1unning with the Land: Viable Doctrine orl:Ommon Law Relic, 7
Hofstra L. Rev. 139, 143 (1978). However, the kinds of burdens
imposed by covenants relating to land generally serve socially
useful ends regardless of whether the benefit is in gross.
Indeed, a careful analysis of decisions involving covenants shows
that courts purporting to adhere to the strict touch and concern
rule are liberal in allowing socially useful covenants to run
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BECAUSE THE AGREEMENTS ARE UNAMBIGUOUS, THE CLOVIS BANKS ARE
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A HATTER OF LAW OR, AT THE LEAST,
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESOLUTION OF DISPUTED
FACTuAL ISSUES.
A.

The Clovis Banks Are Entitled to Judgment as
Hatter of Law.
The

parties

are

in

agreement

that

a

the central

issue in this case is the meaning of the Agreements and that the
interpretation of

the Agreements is a question of law which

should not be based upon extrinsic evidence.

The decisions of

this Court clearly provide that "whether a contract is ambiguous
is a question of law which the court must decide before it takes
~

evidence

in

clarification."

Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
(emphasis added);

Horris

v.

658 P.2d 1199,

Mountain
1200

States

(Utah 1983)

see also Hibdon v. Truck Insurance Exchange,

657 P. 2d 1358 (Utah 1983).

Thus, this Court should look solely

to the Agreements and the Deed to determine the nature and
duration of the Net Profits Interest.
Atlas asserts

that

the trial court adhered to this

standard and found, without resorting to extrinsic evidence, that
the

Agreements

were

unambiguously

limited

in

duration.

In

support of this assertion, Atlas relies on a conclusory statement
to that effect in the district
(wh1~h

court's Findings and Conclusions

Atlas drafted and were adopted with little modification by

!Ven where the benefit is in gross.
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See id. at 158-69.

the district court).

di~trict

Atlas Brief at 47.

However, although the

court made no findings of ambiguity, the Findings and

C~clusions

of

the

district

court are replete with specific

extrinsic evidence which is essential to the district
construction of the Agreements.
Because

the

court's

30

district

court's

construction

of

the

Agreements is at odds with the plain language used by the parties
and is improperly based on extrinsic evidence, this Court should
reject the district court's Findings and Conclusions and make its
own determination of

the meaning

of

the Agreements.

31

The

Clovis Brief demonstrated in detail that the parties intended the
duration of the Agreements and the Net Profits Interest to be
tied to the duration of the Claims, Clovis Brief at 18-31, and
that the terms used by the parties are unambiguous in expressing
that intent.

This Court, therefore, should

consider only the

unambiguous language of the Agreements, and reverse the suuunary

3
°For example, the district court relied on extrinsic evidence
that major operations did not commence immediately after closure
of the Bardon Shaft; that the Interest Owners did not assert in
the Yucca litigation that the Net Profits Interest had not terminated, that written notice to terminate the Bardon Mine was given
to the parties' by Kerr-McGee, and that the Interest Owners did
not exercise the option to take over the Bardon Mine.
See
Findings and Conclusions '1!'1119-24, R. 2089-91; Clovis Brief at
60-65.
3

lrbis Court is as capable as the district court of construing
the Agreements. Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc.,
645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982); ~Clovis Brief at 17-18.
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.. agroe11L,
,0

remanding the case to the trial court with directions

enter Judgment in favor of the Clovis Banks.

B.

At
vacated and

At the Least, if the Agreements are Ambiguous the
Case Must be Remanded to Allow the Trier of Fact
to Resolve Genuine Issues of Material Fact.
the very

least,

the

allowed

case

the

summary

judgment

to

proceed

to

should

trial.

If

be
the

language of the Agreements can somehow be interpreted to mean
that the parties intended the Net Profits Interest not to apply
to all ores mined from the Claims so long as the Claims are in
effect,

this

ambiguous,

Court

~.,

can only conclude that

"Capable of being understood in either two or

more possible senses."
i:_ci 0

,

the Agreements are

Rainier National Bank v. Inland Machinery

29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389, 393 (1981).

ments are ambiguous,

I f the Agree-

the case must be remanded to the district

court for the trier of fact to resolve two genuine issues of
disputed material fact:

(1) whether the parties intended the Net

Profits Interest

to be coterminous with the duration of

Claims

limited

or

to

be

in du rat ion;

and

( 2)

whether

the
the

subsequent occurrence which supposedly caused the Agreements and
the Net Profits Interest to terminate actually occurred.

32

las seeks to escape these disputed issues by emphasizing
themselves argue that the Agreements are
unambiguous and that the Clovis Banks also moved for summary
judgment and in that connection argued that there were "no
genuine issues of material fact." Atlas Brief at 47, 52-53. The
argument is little better than fatuous. The Clovis Banks conl\t

that the Clovis Banks
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1.

If the Agreements are ambiguous, the material
factual issue of the parties' intent remains
to be resolved.

Atlas attempts to divert this Court's attention from
the material factual issue of the parties' intent by urging that
the extrinsic evidence presented by the Clovis Banks

is

not

probative and is not factual evidence of any intent to create a
perpetual interest.

This argument

is a misleading attempt

to

cloud the material issue of the parties' intent with an evaluation of the specific extrinsic evidence on the issue.
The issue of the parties'

intent is clearly material

because, as Atlas itself admits, the nature and duration of the
Net Profits

Interest

is

dependent

interest the parties intended to

wholly
create.

upon what

type

of

Atlas Brief at 44.

Further, if the Agreements are ambiguous, there is no basis in
law to

exclude~

evidence of the parties' opinions, conduct and

positions taken that is relevant in determining their intent and

tended below -- and still contend -- that the Agreements are
unambiguous in creating a net profits interest applicable to "all
ores" mined from the Claims so long as the Claims are in effect,
and thus that there is no genuine issue of fact precluding
judgment in the Clovis Banks' favor. See,~·, Response of the
Clovis Banks at 19-20, 78, R. 1796-97, 1855. The Clovis Banks
clearly explained below the qualified nature of their contention
that no genuine and material issues exist. See Objections of
Clovis Banks to At las' Proposed Findings of Fact at 8- 9, R.
1924-25. Atlas' counsel is no doubt familiar with the phenomenon
of competing motions for sununary judgment, so that it is
difficult to credit Atlas' apparent lack of comprehension of the
Clovis Banks' position in this regard.
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,,.tat1ons

in

entering

into

the

Agreements. 33

Indeed,

in

e, 0 iuat1ng the specific extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent

tls

Court must view all of the evidence in the

favorable to the Clovis Banks.

light most

Clovis Brief at 18, 66.

If some of the extrinsic evidence relied upon by Atlas
somehow shows an intent to limit the duration of the Net Profits
Interest, the extrinsic evidence raised by the Clovis Banks is
certainly sufficient to rebut that evidence and raise a genuine
issue
tent.

of

34

disputed material

fact

concerning the parties'

in-

Thus, if the Agreements are ambiguous, the trier of

1\tlas makes a broad leap in reasoning by asserting that
because the question of "whether the AGREEMENTS are ambiguous is
a question of law . . . extrinsic evidence of the parties later
recollection of their subjective intent in 1957 has no probative
value." Atlas Brief at 47. It is true that if the Agreements
are unambiguous, the trial court should not have considered~
extrinsic evidence in construing the terms. It does not follow,
however, that if the Agreements are ambiguous then evidence of
the parties' subjective intent is not probative of what the
parties intended the contract to mean. If the Agreements are
ambiguous, the trier of fact may consider all extrinsic evidence
of the parties' intent, including the parties' own testimony of
their subjective intent ions in entering the contract.
See
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Rainier
Nat'l Bank v. Inland Machinery Co., 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d
359 (1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §212 comment
(1981); 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §538, at 61-63 (1960).
34
The fact that the parties used the term of art "Net Profits
lr1 lPrest" is sufficient alone to raise the factual issue of
•h~ther the parties intended those words to have a meaning other
th .. n the meaning normally attributed by the mining industry. In
Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336,
338-39, 400 P.2d 564, 566 (1965), this Court held that where the
contract terms had a particular meaning, the intended meaning of
the terms was properly regarded as a factual dispute. It was
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fact

should

~'

evldence,

d~eanor

be

weigh
of

required
any

to

evaluate

conflicting

witnesses

and

all

of

testimony,

determine

their

the

and

extrinsic

observe

credibility

the
in

de-iermining the parties' intent.
2.

If the district court's construction of the
agreements is adopted, the material factual
issue of whether the
"mining venture"
terminated must be resolved.

As pointed out

in the Clovis Brief, Clovis Brief at

68-69, assuming arguendo that the Agreements were intended to be
limited to a "specific mining venture," this construction leaves
unanswered the material factual issue of whether that venture
ended in 1961 (or at sometime in 1962 as Atlas now contends).
Unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Clovis Banks, compels acceptance of Atlas' factual
that

Kerr-McGee

fully

explored

the

Claims

and

premise,~

reached

.•

the

conclusion that no further exploration was justified, this Court
must reverse the summary judgment for resolution of this factual
issue.
In fact,

no such evidence exists.

There is no letter

or memorandum from Kerr-McGee indicating that further exploration
was unwarranted, no oral testimony to that effect, and no written
or oral statement indicating, directly or indirectly, that any of

therefore proper for the trial court to hear testimony by experts
in the field as to the generally understood and accepted meaning
of the language as used in the transaction in question.
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~

parties to the agreements ever understood that the "mining

veature"

'
r~cluded.

them)

had been

Rather, the evidence is to the contrary.

In 1962,

(if

that

concept

meant

anything

to

after the Bardon Shaft had been abandoned, Kerr-McGee explicitly
declared its

intention to resume exploration as

soon as

the

accounting difficulties created by the Bardon operation could be
cleaned up.
1962), R.

Letter from Kerr-McGee to Wm. Dean McDougald (Hay 9,

1882.

difficulties

Although the prolongation of these accounting

and Kerr-McGee's

conditional

assignment

of

the

claims prevented Kerr-McGee itself from resuming operations, the
Court wi 11 search the record (and the At las Brief) in vain for
evidence

that

successors

either Kerr-McGee

even made

or any

of

a determination that

should not be undertaken.

the Kerr-McGee's
further exploration

Moreover, as Atlas elsewhere acknow-

ledges, Kerr-McGee retained until 1970 an option to reacquire the
Claims, Atlas Brief at 12, and ultimately relinquished the option
only in exchange for a very valuable production royalty in the
Claims.

Deed from Kerr-McGee to Foote Minerals Co., R. 1670-72.

Kerr-McGee's decision to retain the option, and its acquisition
of the royalty,

hardly square with Atlas' bald assertion that

Kerr-McGee had decided that the Claims had been "fully" explored
"'"1 that
~ven"

further work was unwarranted.

Thus, the "terminating

upon which Atlas relies never in fact occurred.
Lacking any evidence of such termination, Atlas resorts

to offuscation by emphasizing evidence showing that the parties
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intended to terminate the operation on the Bardon Shaft.
Brief at

S~ft

52-53.

No one disputes,

of

course,

Atlas

that the Bardon

was abandoned; but such evidence is simply meaningless with

res-pect to the issue in this case.

35

Richard T. Zitting, then

35 the Operating Agreement explicity provided in Section V for
the abandonment of particular mines.
In proposing
the
abandonment of the Bardon Shaft, Kerr-McGee specifically stated
that the Operating Agreement applied to the Claims, referred to
Section V and gave a precise legal description of the property to
be abandoned, once again acknowledging that only part of the
Claims were affected.
Section V does not provide, nor did
Kerr-McGee ever suggest, that abandonment of the Bardon Shaft
would affect in any way the parties' rights and obligations with
respect to the rest of the Claims.
In its letter proposing
abandonment of the Bardon Shaft, Kerr-McGee stated:
Reference is made to that certain Operating
Agreement dated April 18, 1957, entered into by and
between Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., Mercury
Uranium and Oil Company and .
. [the) Interest Owners;
which Operating Agreement pertains to the following
described unpatented lode mining claims, to-wit:
Velvet Claims 1-34, inclusive
Royal Flush Claims 1-4, inclusive
Pursuant to Article V of said Operating Agreement,
notice is hereby given to you that Kerr-McGee Oil
Industries, Inc. and Anderson Development Corporation
by mutual agreement now desire to abandon the mine and
the working in connection therewith located on and
servicing that part (said part being the area desired
to be abandoned) of the lands covered by the above
described
claims more particularly described as
follows, to-wit:
A tract of land situated in the NW/4 of Section 3,
T. 31 S., R. 25 E., Salt Lake Meridian, San Juan
County, Utah more fully described as follows:
Commencing at a point 125 feet due south from the
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,Hr-McGee's Manager of Mineral Exploration,
oa~h
0/

has stated under

that neither he nor any of the other parties ever believed

intended that the Net Profits Interest would terminate upon

ttte winding up of the Bardon Shaft operation. 36
Like

its

proposed

construction of

the Agreements,

Atlas' position on the material factual issue of termination is
hopelessly contradictory.

Atlas cannot even consistently des-

cribe, let alone support, the version of the facts that it would
like the Court to accept, and thus admits that factual issues
remain.

Though the reasons for the district court's ruling are

admittedly obscure, the ruling is itself clear in at least two
particulars.

The district court certainly ruled, first, that the

NW corner Section 3, T. 31 S., R. 25 E., thence
due east 650 feet to NE corner of said tract;
thence due south 500 feet to SE corner of said
tract; thence due west 650 feet to SW corner of
said tract; thence due north 500 feet to NW corner
of said tract, the point of beginning.
Letter from Kerr-McGee to Interest Owners
1606-07 (emphasis added).

(Dec.

19, 1962), R.

36
see Affidavit of Richard T. Zitting, R. 1771-73.
The
abandonment of the Bardon Shaft is perhaps relevant to the issue
in this case in one respect.
The correspondence between
Knr-HcGee and the Interest Owners shows that when the parties
desired to terminate or abandon something, they knew how to do
so. Kerr-McGee's letter abandoning the Bardon Shaft is clear and
precise in identifying the authorizing provision and in
explaining the legal effect of the abandonment. Any similar
letter or statement declaring Kerr-McGee's supposed decision that
further exploration was unjustified, or even hinting at any such
decision, is conspicuously non-existent.
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Net Profits Interest terminated in 1961, and, second, that the
ev~nt

-~
r.t -

triggering this
Shaft. 37

termination was

This scenario,

the

however,

abandonment

is not

of the

only without

support in the record -- Atlas cites no evidence even suggesting
that all of the Claims had been "fully," or even significantly,
explored by the end of 1960 --

but is decisively

refuted by

Kerr-McGee's unequivocal declaration in 1962, more than a year
after all operations had supposedly been wound up, that further
exploration was planned.
Atlas

discreetly waits

38

Attempting to cope with this fact,

in its brief for 27 pages and then,

completely abandoning both its own
district

court's

ruling,

earlier

proposes

a

position

wholly

new

and

the

scenario:

Kerr-McGee's supposed decision to discontinue exploration on the
claims did not occur before 1961 after all; rather, it must have
happened "some time near December 31, 1962.''

Atlas Brief at 50

n. 142.
Thus,

Atlas'

own inconsistencies show that a dispute

exists as to facts that are essential to the district court's

37
Findings and Conclusions ~~ 38, 39, 41, 42, R. 2097 - 2103.
Atlas makes occasional attempts to defend this ruling, arguing at
one point that by the time the Bardon Shaft was abandoned in late
1960 or early 1961, Kerr-McGee had already fully explored the
remaining claims, so that no further operations were contemplated
after the Bardon operation was wound up. Atlas Brief at 23 n.
76.
38

see Letter from Kerr-McGee to Wm.
1962), R. 1882; Clovis Brief at 9-10.
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Dean McDougald

(Hay 9,

Whichever of Atlas' factual scenarios this Court might
choose to consider, if the Agreements are ambiguous, the evidence

s~ws

that disputed material factual issues exist.

This Court,

therefore, at the least must remand the case for the trier of
fact to resolve these genuine and material factual issues.

CONCLUSION
The new arguments and theories raised by Atlas in its
brief cannot support the district court's ruling.

As shown in

the Clovis Brief and in this Reply, this Court should reverse the
district court's ruling and remand the case with instructions to
enter summary judgment in favor of the Clovis Banks.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 1983.

Attorneys for The Clovis National
Bank and The Citizens Bank of
Clovis
MODRALL, SPERLING, ROEHL, HARRIS
& SISK
Allen C. Dewey, Jr., Esq.
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